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EXPERT TESTIMONY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
Maryland Judicial Institute 
October 16,2003 
Professor Lynn McLain 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
I. Underlying Goals of the Rules of Evidence in General 
• Getting as close to the truth as possible, while maximizing efficiency, so as to 
obtain maximum fairness with minimum expenditure of court time. 
• Admit only evidence relevant to issues in the case. 
• Do best to exclude unreliable evidence (but rely on cross as to matters of 
credibility of witnesses). 
II. Expert Testimony 
§ 1. The Rules Regarding Expert Testimony: When, What, Who, and How'? 
The question of when to permit expert testimony, and on what subjects, is 
governed by Md. Rules 5-401, 5-403, and 5-702. 
• Who may testifY as an expert is governed by Rules 5-702 and 5-706. 
• How experts' testimony is elicited is governed by Rules 5-703, 5-704, and 5-705. 
General References: 
PAUL W. GRIMM, MARYLAND EVIDENCE CHECKLISTS (MICPEL 1989) (lay opinions, 20; 
experts, 21). 
JOSEPH MURPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK (3d ed. 1999) (§ 567(A), Statistical 
probability; §§ 1400-1409, Expert testimony). 
LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 
2003), vols. 5,6, and 6A of West's Maryland Practice Series: 
vol. 5: § 20 I: I - :5, Maryland state law regarding taking judicial notice. 
§ 20 I :6, federal law regarding taking judicial notice. 
§ 300:7, effect of introduction of expert testimony, and when expert testimony is 
needed to meet the burden of production of the evidence. 
§ 40 1:4, Maryland state law regarding scientific evidence. 
§ 40 I :8. federal law regarding scientific evidence. 
vol. 6: § 70 I: I - :7, Maryland state law regarding lay opinion testimony. 
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§ 701 :8, federal law regarding lay opinion testimony. 
§§ 702: 1 - :5, 703: 1, 704: 1, 705: 1, 706: 1, Maryland state law regarding experts. 
§§ 702:6, 703:2, 704:2, 705:2, 706:2, federal law regarding experts. 
LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2002), vol. 7 of West's 
Maryland Practice Series (rules with brief commentary). 
§ 2. When is Expert Testimony Appropriate? 
a. In General 
At earlier common law, expert testimony was permitted only if the subject was so 
beyond the ken, the understanding and experience, of the average juror that the jury could 
not begin to interpret the facts on its own. 
The modem rule, however, is not so strict: as codified in the second clause of Md. 
Rule 5-702, it provides that expert testimony will be admissible if it "will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... " Whether the 
evidence will be helpful - as well as whether a particular witness is qualified as an expert 
- is decided by the trial court, in its discretion. 
b. Possible Rulint:s as to Helpfulness/Admissibility 
When expert testimony is offered, there are three possible results under Rule 5-702. 
(1) The first is that proffered expert testimony is inadmissible, because it would 
not assist the jury. This can be because of one of two reasons: 
Either (a) The jury would not need it at all to objectively evaluate the facts ... 
Example: Truck Ins. Exchange v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 285 Md. 428 (1980) 
(abuse of discretion to allow insurance expert's testimony as to 
meaning of contract clause, "passenger cars he may rent to others 
or operate under his Thrifty Rent-A-Car franchise," when the 
words used had no technical meaning). 
or (b) The proffered expert opinion has an insutTiciently reliable basis (e.g., "junk 
science"). This possibility will be explored further in parts IX.-X. infra. 
(2) A second possibility is that the court or the jury needs expert testimony, 
because common sense and logic are insufficient to evaluate the facts. Expert 
testimony is not only admissible, it may be necessary in order for a party to meet 
its burden of production of the evidence, so as to withstand a motion for 
judgment. 
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Examples: (1) In a medical malpractice case, P offers testimony of a lab 
technician that a pre-operation blood test showed that the 
osmillality in P's blood was 480 micromoles per second. 
(What significance, if any, has this evidence? An expert's 
explanation is needed.) 
(ii) Hricko v. State, 134 Md. App. 218 (2000) (a Shakespearean 
odyssey by Judge Charles Moylan about the real murder 
during a St. Michaels, MD murder-mystery-weekend) 
(medical examiner may testify that cause of death was 
probably poisoning, by an unidentified substance), cert. 
denied, 362 Md. 188 (2000). 
(3) A third possibility is that the party does not need expert testimony to meet its 
burden of production, but it would be helpful to the fact-finder. In this 
situation, expert testimony will be admissible, in the court's discretion. 
Problem. 
1. Determine which of the above three standards applies to each of the following 
scenarios from an early dental malpractice case, Toy v. Mackintosh, 110 N.E. 
1034 (Mass. 1916). 
P-Patient sued D-Dentist for negligence in letting a tooth fall down P's throat. P 
testifies he had several teeth extracted by D while P was under an anesthetic, and that 
nine weeks later P coughed up a tooth (which he entered into evidence). 
a. D moves for a directed verdict, on the ground that P failed to offer any 
expert testimony regarding breach of duty. Should the motion be 
granted? 
b. D testifies to his own skill and experience and wishes to call other experts 
to testify to precautions routinely taken and, in effect, that P's inhaling of a 
tooth is consistent with due care. Should the court let in the expert 
testimony? 
c. At the close of D's case, D again moves for a directed verdict, on the 
ground that his expert testimony "beats" P's testimony. Should his 
motion be granted? 
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d. Consider also the issue of causation of damages. P testified that he was in 
good health before the dental surgery. Soon after the operation, he developed 
a cough and severe pain in the left side of his body. Subsequently, he lost part 
of his ability to speak, grew dizzy, and his right arm and leg were numb. 
These symptoms continued at trial, although after he coughed up the tooth, his 
cough was immediately relieved. D's experts testify that the non-cough 
symptoms had nothing to do with the tooth and were caused instead by two 
shocks that P had received. D moves for a directed verdict on the damages 
issue regarding everything but the cough. Should the motion be granted? 
See Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker, 2003 WL 22051771 *6-7 (Md. App. Sept. 3,2003) 
(absent a close temporal relationship between Freon incident and onset of asthma, expert 
testimony was needed to meet plaintiff s burden of production). 
III. The Test as to Opinion Testimony, Whether Expert or Lay 
No matter whether lay opinion (Rule 5-701) or expert opinion (Rule 5-702), the 
test for admissibility is whether the opinion is rationally based and will be helpful to the 
jury (or to the court as factfinder). 
By virtue of Rule 5-704(a), there is no longer a per se rule barring legal 
conclusions. The question remains, rather, one of helpfulness. 
A synthesis of the case law generates the following factors to be used in 
evaluating whether an opinion should be admitted: 
1. Is the opinion supported by a sufficient rational basis? Or, for example, 
is it merely speculation or conjecture? If a lay opinion, would the witness 
need to be an expert to reach a rational opinion? 
2. Will the opinion provide more information than the jury could get 
otherwise? Or will it be merely superfluous, so that the jury could figure 
it out just as well for itself? In that event, we want to avoid the possibility 
of undue influence on the jury by admitting opinion testimony. 
3. Will opinion testimony provide the most efficient and practical way for 
the jury to hear the evidence? Or could the testimony be helpfully 
ratcheted back to the underlying facts, so that we leave the jury to reach 
the conclusion on its own? (Let the jury "connect the dots.") See, e.g., 
Cook v. State, 84 Md. App. 122, 135-44 (1990) (reversible error to allow 
police officer to give expert opinions as to each defendant's role in drug 
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operation; expert should have testified only "that the head of the 
organization is usually armed and usually has the organization's money on 
his person" and let the jury make further findings). 
For good reason, therefore, the standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. 
Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 115-28 (1997); Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 572-81 
(1992). 
Problems. 
2. Plaintiff calls witness to testify that storeowner's leaving a barrel on the sidewalk 
outside his store was negligent. Admit? 
Brunker v, Cummins, 32 N.E. 732 (Ind. 1892). See also American Mut. Ins, Co, v, Bittle, 26 Md, 
App. 434,442 (1975). 
3. A lay witness is called to testify that she saw bloodstains on her roommate's shirt. 
Admit? 
See Daniels v, State, 213 Md, 90, 105 (1957), 
4. Buddy of defendant is called to testify that he was with defendant and that, 
although the defendant had had a couple of drinks, he was not drunk. Admit? 
See Cumberland & Westernport Transit Co, v, Metz, 158 Md. 424, 451,453-54 (1930); Crampton 
v, State, 71 Md. App. 375, 388 (1987), ajJ'd on other grounds, 314 Md, 265 (1988). 
5. Friend of victim is called to testify that when defendant visited victim and friend 
at friend's house the day before victim's murder, the defendant was shouting and 
angry at the victim. Admit? 
See Lawson v, Ward, 153 Md. 93, 98 (1927), 
6. In CINA proceeding, State calls mother-in-law of mother to testify that mother is 
a terrible housekeeper and that her home has always been filthy whenever mother-
in-law has visited. Admit? 
And that daughter-in-law is "unfit to be a mother." Admit? 
7. In rape case, State's expert wishes to testify that rape victims often suffer PTSD. 
Admit? And that, indeed, the victim suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
caused by rape. Admit? 
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The Court of Appeals in State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89 (1986), stressed that the doctor did not use 
the term "'rape trauma syndrome'" and thus did not "equate the syndrome exclusively with rape." 
While the majority found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of the PTSD 
evidence in Allewalt, it cautioned that questions were left unanswered, such as whether a defendant 
could prove the absence of PTSD, and stated that in the future: 
When ruling on whether to receive State proffered evidence of PTSD a trial judge will 
have to weigh the benefit of the evidence not only against potential unfair prejudice, but 
also against the complexity of possibly accompanying issues and against the time 
required properly to try the expanded case. 
308 Md. at 11 0 (emphasis added). See Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 68-71 (1993) (in child sexual 
abuse prosecution, clinical psychologist's testimony that child's observed behaviors were 
consistent with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was admitted properly, under Allewalt, when 
expert "was able, through history, to connect the PTSD to the criminal conduct charged"). 
See also Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480 (1995) (reversible error to permit expert testimony 
that alleged sexual child abuse victim suffered from PTSD that was "not in any way faked," when 
basis of opinion was statements of child and it was, in effect, a comment on the victim's 
credibility; Allewalt was distinguished on ground that expert there was simply asked to "assume 
the victim's truthfulness") (Rodowsky, J., concurring, joined by Murphy C.J., disagreed, pointing 
out that excluding an expert's opinion, when it has a basis, part of which is the patient's history, 
has not been the law in Maryland; to reach a diagnosis of PTSD, the expert must find that the 
described stressor occurred). 
In Hall v. State, 107 Md. App. 684, 691-92 (1996), cert. denied, 342 Md. 473 (1996), 
remanded to the Court of Special Appeals for reconsideration in light of Hutton, then Judge Joseph 
Murphy summarized Hutton as follows: 
Hutton . .. prohibits counsel from (1) asking a witness directly whether he or she 
personally believes the testimony of another person, and (2) introducing expert testimony 
in a way that presents the trier of fact with an expert's assertion of personal belief that 
another person's testimony is true. Nothing in Hutton, however, prohibits an expert from 
opining that the child's behavioral problems are consistent with abuse. 
The Hall court concluded, therefore, that the trial court had not committed error in 
permitting the state to elicit an expert's opinion that "there was a strong cause-effect relationship 
between child abuse and the disorders from which the victim was suffering" (although the better 
form for the opinion would have been that "the victim's disorders 'are consistent' with disorders 
found in children who have suffered sexual child abuse"). 107 Md. App. at 695. 
The defense in Hall was that the child victim's charges were "fabrications or 
imaginations" and that the child was unworthy of belief because of conduct and stress disorders, 
the latter perhaps caused by having been placed in four different foster homes. Under the facts of 
the case, "[tJhe State was entitled to guard against the risk that the trier of fact would commit an 
'untutored layman's error of dismissing as non-credible testimony that, in the arcane context of 
child abuse, should not be so readily dismissed.'" Id. 
8. Child who was in next room and could not see shooter is called to testify that her 
stepfather said nothing but pointed gun straight at her mom and then shot her 
mother. Admit? 
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9. Expert mechanical engineer who specialized in researching automotive safety, 
particularly vehicle ejections and door latch failures, has examined latch on 
decedent's 1992 Dodge Ram pickup and wishes to testifY that the latch was not 
state of the art or state of the industry in 1992 and that it is his opinion, to a 
reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that a state of the industry latch would 
have prevented door from opening in crash. Admit? 
Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3760 (May 2003). 
10. Defendant was charged with making threats against the President. Defendant had 
sent anti-Pres. Clinton communications to defendant's neighbors, some 
businesses, and some state and local governmental organizations, which 
forwarded them to the police and the Secret Service. The government was 
required to prove that a reasonable person would foresee that his statements would 
be interpreted as threats by those to whom the defendant communicated. It called 
three Secret Service agents and one police commander to testifY that the writings 
were significant threats to the President. Admit? 
United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002). 
11. Police officer wishes to testifY that victim made no inconsistent statements during 
her several interviews. Admit? 
Robinson v. State, 151 Md. App. 384, 393-95 (2003). 
12. Wrongful death plaintiff wishes to call a toxicology expert to testify to effect of 
defendant truck driver's smoking some marijuana eight hours before accident. 
Admit? 
Bocanegra v. Vicmar Services, Inc, 320 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2003). 
13. Psychiatric expert's testimony as to effects of illegal searches on fans at a 
basketball tournament. Admit? 
Williams v. Brown, 244 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D. 111. 2003). 
14. In antitrust suit, both plaintiff and defendant offer expert testimony regarding 
economic principles, such as effect of higher liquor prices on consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. Admit? 
TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 325 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2003). 
15. In kidnapping and interstate domestic violence case, when victim testified 
inconsistently with her grand jury testimony, her 911 calls, and her written 
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statement, prosecution offered expert testimony regarding domestic abuse victims' 
frequent recantations, as well as their inability to perceive means of escape. The 
expert, a psychiatric mental health nurse who specialized in crime victims, had 
interviewed the victim personally, reviewed police reports of other confrontations 
between victim and defendant, and listened to recordings of their conversations 
while defendant was in pre-trial detention. Admit? 
United States v. Young, 316 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2002). Cf Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207 
(\ 994) (no abuse of discretion to admit, in rebuttal, expert testimony by a psychologist about the 
fact that recantation by child sexual abuse victims of their initial reports, while still exposed to 
family members, and subsequent retraction of the recantation once the child's support systems 
were in place, was "both normal and very common"). 
Opinions on the credibility of a witness's testimony in the case, however, are precluded. 
E.g., Bentley v. Carroll, 355 Md. 312, 332-39 (1999) (trial court erred in permitting defense 
psychiatrist to testifY that, based on MMPI, plaintiff was exaggerating her claims); Bohnert v. 
State, 312 Md. 266 (1988) (under circumstances, admitting expert opinion that child had been 
sexually abused, based only on what victim had said, was an abuse of discretion; but also, as an 
"alternative reason," the opinion was inadmissible "as a matter oflaw" because it was an opinion 
that child's testimony was credible); Snyder v. State, 104 Md. App. 533, 551-54 (1995) (reversible 
error to permit police detective to testifY as to questions he had for defendant, which clearly 
showed his disbelief of defendant's story). But cf Nero v. State, 144 Md. App. 333, 354-57 
(2002) (no error in admitting officer's testimony that identifYing witnesses seemed "very certain" 
when making their identifications; this was not an evaluation of witnesses' credibility). 
16. Lay opinion whether a revolving door moved easily, rapidly or slowly. Admit? 
Eyerlyv. Baker, 168 Md. 599, 612-13 (1935). 
17. Lay opinion whether a cornfield would have obscured view of oncoming train. 
Admit? 
See Baltimore, C. & A. Ry. v. Turner, 152 Md. 216, 223-25 (1927); McAdoo v. State ex rel. 
Kuntzman, 136 Md. 452,459 (J 920). 
18. Lay opinion of son-in-law, who knew testatrix very well for many years, that she 
was a "staunch business woman." Admit? 
Wagner v. Klein, 125 Md. 229, 234-35 (1915). 
19. Mother's testimony as to whether daughter'S behavior and demeanor changed 
after her alleged rape. Admit? 
Kingv. State, 36 Md. App. 124, 135 (1977). 
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20. Whether a car observed by witness, who was an experienced driver, could have 
stopped within certain distance. Admit? 
Bozman v. State ex rei. Cronhardt, 177 Md. 151, 156-57 (1939). 
21. Witness's opinion as to what was witness's attorney's purpose in advising her as 
he did. Admit? 
Robinson v. State, 47 Md. App. 558, 571-73 (1981). 
22. State trooper's testimony, based on seeing baggie, that contents ofbaggie were 
rocks of crack cocaine. Admit? That they looked like rocks of crack cocaine (and 
other circumstantial evidence was admitted to show that they were). Admit? 
Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104 (1997). 
23. Mother's testimony that car crash was cause of her subsequent illness and of her 
needing a Caesarean for her ninth child. Admit? 
Symington v. Graham, 165 Md. 441,446-49 (1933). 
24. Whether witness believed that work was done according to terms of contract. 
Admit? 
County Comm 'rs v. Bel Air Suburban Improvement Ass 'n, 134 Md. 548, 552 (1919). 
25. Whether another witness testified truthfully. Admit? 
American Stores Co. v. Herman, 166 Md. 312, 314-15 (1934). 
26. Whether persons on surveillance videotape were defendants. Admit? 
Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11,31-32 (1988). Compare Cochrane v. McGinnis, 160 F. Supp. 2d 447, 
450-52 (E.D.N.Y. 200 I), ajJ'd on other grounds, 50 Fed. Appx. 478 (2d Cir. 2002). 
27. Whether scaffolding over sidewalk made walking on sidewalk dangerous. 
Admit? 
Weilbacher v. J W Putts Co., 123 Md. 249, 267 -68 (1914). 
28. Whether an open suitcase smelled like oranges. Admit? 
Smelled like marijuana? Admit? 
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See Smith v. State, 182 Md. 176, 183 (1943) (proper to admit witness testimony that noise sounded 
like the breaking of cement; "Opinion, so far as it consists of a statement of an effect produced on 
the mind, ... [is] admissible whenever a condition of things is such that it cannot be reproduced 
and made palpable in the concrete to the jury. This is particularly true with regard to noises and 
odors."). 
29. Officer asked to testify whether defendant "could have been" on PCP when 
arrested. Admit? 
Beyv. State, 140 Md. App. 607, 622-25 (2001), cert. denied, 368 Md. 526 (2002). 
IV. Opinions in Out-of-Court Statements 
§ 1. Opinions Contained in Admissions of Parties-Opponent 
Statements offered as admissions of a party opponent need not comply with 
the opinion rule, when they include the party-opponent's opinion. See 2 MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 256. A party is held responsible for statements of opinion he or she 
made. But cf Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 139 (1991) (admission of evidence, as a 
statement by a party-opponent, that driver paid preset traffic fine would be prejudicial, 
"'backdoor' admission of a police officer's opinion of [the driver's] guilt"). 
Of course, unless the admission is a binding judicial admission, the party is 
free to deny making the statement or to explain why it was wrong. 
The trial court, in its discretion under Rule 5-403, however, may exclude 
unhelpful or uninformed party admissions. See Suburban Hasp. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Hadary, 
22 Md. App. 186, 195 (1974) (in medical malpractice action, no error to exclude opinion 
of patient, expressed in course of a deposition, that "she didn't consider [doctor] at fault 
at all"). 
§ 2. Other Out-of-Court Statements, Including Prior Consistent or Inconsistent 
Statements 
Generally, the opinion rule ought not be applied to exclude out-of-court 
statements, otherwise admissible either for impeachment purposcs, as nonhearsay, 
or under exceptions to the hearsay rulc, because those statements cannot be rephrased 
to be more factual. See State v. Jones, 311 Md. 23, 32-33 (1987). If, however, the 
statement contains both an opinion and the facts underlying it, the court, in its discretion 
under Rule 5-403, may redact the opinion. 
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§ 3. Expert Opinions Contained Within Out-of-Court Statements Falling under a 
Hearsay Exception, Such as Business Records 
Expert opinions that are contained in out-of-court statements that are not excluded 
by the hearsay rule generally will be admissible, if they appear to have been made by a 
qualified expert, with an adequate basis, on a proper subject, and would otherwise 
have been admissible, if the expert had testified to them. See 2 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 287. 
But if they appear to lack an adequate basis, or the opponent otherwise 
demonstrates that there is a genuine issue as to what opinion the expert held or 
whether it was valid, the court should require the expert to testify. See Shpigel v. White, 
357 Md. 117 (1999) (in hotly contested personal injury motor vehicle tort case, causation 
and damages could not be proved through medical records and bills, without live witness 
testimony regarding reasonableness of charges and need for treatment); Reynolds v. State, 
98 Md. App. 348, 355-61 (1993) (reversible error to violate child sexual abuse 
defendant's confrontation right by admitting hospital records of his daughter's-the 
complaining witness' -stay in hospital psychiatric unit, when records contained doctors' 
opinions that defendant may have sexually abused her; confrontation right is violated if 
opinions appeared to lack a legally adequate basis as in this case, or if the opinion is too 
ambiguous to be helpful). 
V. Telling the Chickens from the Eggs: Facts, Opinions, Experts, and Lay Witnesses 
§ 1. Of "Fact" Witnesses, "Opinion" Witnesses, "Testifying" Witnesses, and 
"Hybrid" Witnesses 
Just drawing the line between "facts" and "opinions" can be challenging. See 
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167-69 (1988) (discussing the analytical 
difficulty in drawing a line between "fact" and "opinion"), on remand, 868 F.3d 1531 
(lIth Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
§ 2. Who May Testify as an Expert? 
Under Rule 5-702, the trial judge determines, in his or her discretion, whether a 
particular proffered expert witness is qualified to testifY. As stated by Wigmore, the 
question for the trial court to consider in exercising this discretion is, "On this subject can 
a jury receive appreciable help from this person?" 
Formal education is not required. Rule 5-702 refers to "a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education .... " For example, 
fisherman, plumbers, and teenaged computer hackers could all be possible experts, 
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despite a lack of formal education. See Corsea v. Cruisers, a Division ofHCS Int 'I, Inc., 
298 F.3d 13,25-27 (lst Cir. 2002) (marine engines). 
Sufficient case law has developed to guide counsel and the trial courts on many 
questions. For example, a general practitioner M.D. generally has been held to be 
acceptable to testifY as to any medical field; a specialist is not required. Contra Ralston 
v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 968-70 (lOth Cir. 2001) (because 
proffered testimony must pass Daubert analysis in federal court, mere possession of 
medical degree does not qualifY a physician to testify concerning any medical-related 
issue). 
Problems. 
30. Plaintiff calls an acupuncturist who had some college education but is not an 
osteopath, to testify to plaintiffs back injuries. Admit? 
Ueland v. United States, 291 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2002). 
31. Defendant wishes to call physicist to testifY that fall from bunk bed could have 
caused injuries that killed defendant's toddler stepdaughter. Admit? 
See Neverson v. Bessonnette, 242 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Mass. 2003) (on writ of habeas corpus). 
32. Hospital billing manager is called to testify to necessity for medical procedures. 
Admit? 
Desuav. Yokim, 137 Md. App. 138, 145-47 (2001). 
33. Medical doctor is called to testifY as an expert on life insurance. Admit? 
Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191,216 (2002). 
34. Certified clinical social worker is called to testifY as to mental disorders. Admit? 
In re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ 147 46, 360 Md. 634, 648-49 (2000). 
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Procedure 
The proponent of an expert first must elicit the witness's qualifications on direct, 
then offer the witness as an expert in the designated field. The opponent may object, 
either on the ground that the subject matter is improper or that the witness is unqualified. 
With permission of the court, the opponent may voir dire the witness on these points --
essentially during an interruption of the witness's direct examination. 
If the court accepts the witness as an expert in the designated field, it will instruct 
the jury that the witness "has been accepted as an expert on [subject X] and is qualified to 
give his or her opinions on this subject." 
• Note, however, that the Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to FRE 702 
speaks favorably of District of Columbia's district Judge Richey's proposal that 
the witness be referred to not as an "expert," but rather as an "opinion witness." 
Might that be preferable? He also gives an immediate instruction upon 
qualification of an opinion witness, emphasizing that the jury is not bound by the 
witness' opinion. See Charles R. Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial 
Effect of the Use of the Word "Expert" under the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS p. 537. 
§ 3. When is an Opinion Expert and When is it Lay and Why Does it Matter? 
• Rule 5-701 provides: 
Rule 5-701. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony in the fonn of opinions 
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (I) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the 
detennination of a fact in issue. 
Rule 5-702 adds special requirements for expert testimony, and Rules 5-602, 5-
703, 5-705, and 5-706 provide special benefits regarding experts. (Rule 5-706 
empowers the court to appoint its own experts, if appropriate, though 
commentators complain that this power is underutilized by judges.) 
Special discovery rules also apply re: experts. A resulting problem in federal 
courts led to amendment of FRE 701 so that it explicitly does not apply to 
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 
702." See Certain Underwriters v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(reversible error to permit insurance investigator's opinions, regarding 
hypothetical use of anchor, as lay testimony under FRE 701). 
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Problems. 
Maryland has seen no need for a similar amendment. Cf Dorsey v. Nold, 
362 Md. 241 (2001) (reversible error not to permit medical malpractice plaintiffs 
to call medical examiner as expert in their case-in-chief, to testify that child died 
from asphyxia due to tumor's compression of airway; Rule 2-402(e)(l) did not 
require expert witness disclosure as to M.E., whose findings or opinions were not 
"acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation."). 
35. State trooper testified as a lay witness regarding accident. May he be cross-
examined as if he had been qualified as an expert? 
Goren v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 113 Md. App. 674 (1997). 
36. ATF agent's testimony that guns in defendant's possession were not collector's 
items. Does this qualify as a lay opinion? 
United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1767 (2003). 
37. Plaintiff ship repairer's employees and officers wish to testify that their charges 
were reasonable. Admissible as lay opinion, rather than expert? 
Tampa Bay Shipwelding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213 (11 th Cir. 2003). 
VI. May/Must the Expert Testify at Trial as to the Details on Which the Expert's 
Opinion is Based? 
§ 1. Rule 5-702 
Rule 5-702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS. 
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the fonn of an opinion or otherwise, if the court 
detennines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to detennine 
a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine (I) whether the witness is 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the 
appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient 
factual basis exists to support the expert testimony. 
-14-
§ 2. Rule 5-705 
Rule 5-705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION. 
Unless the court requires otherwise, the expert may testify in tenns of opinion or 
inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. The 
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 
Rule 5-705 permits an expert to testify to an opinion or inference "without first 
testifYing to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise." This 
provision was intended to free counsel from having to relate lengthy, soporific 
hypothetical questions, which by prior case law had to include every material fact in 
evidence essential to the formulation of the expert's opinion, e.g., Mathieson Alkali 
Works v. Redden, 177 Md. 560 (1940), before permitting the expert to testifY to his or her 
opInIOn. 
Quaere: 
• Still, what reason to have the expert state his or her basis, at least in general terms, 
is supplied by Rule 5-702? 
• What tactical reason may remain that will encourage counsel to have his or her 
expert testifY to the underlying facts or data? 
Suppose that the court accepts plaintiffs physician as an expert in the field of 
medicine. Plaintiffs counsel, having so qualified the witness, then abruptly asks the 
witness, "Do you have an opinion to a reasonable medical certainty as to the permanence 
of the plaintiffs injuries?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "What is that opinion?" 
Defense counsel: "Objection! Counsel is required to lay a factual basis for that 
opinion first!" Would you allow the question? 
• What if the underlying data are inadmissible as substantive evidence? 
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§ 3. Rule 5-703 
Rule 5-703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS. 
(a) In general. 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
(b) Disclosure to jury. 
If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged, facts 
or data reasonably relied upon by an expert pursuant to section (a) may, in the discretion of the 
court, be disclosed to the jury even if those facts and data are not admissible in evidence. Upon 
request, the court shall instruct the jury to use those facts and data only for the purpose of 
evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert's opinion or inference. 
(c) Right to challenge expert. 
This Rule does not limit the right of an opposing party to cross-examine an expert witness 
or to test the basis of the expert's opinion or inference. 
Committee note. -- Subject to Rule 5-403, and in criminal cases the confrontation clause, experts 
who rely on information from others may relate that information in their testimony if it is of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. If it is inadmissible as substantive proof, it comes in 
merely to explain the factual basis for the expert opinion. The opposing party then is entitled to an 
instruction to the jury that it may consider the evidence only for that limited purpose. See, e.g., 
Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573 (1989); Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667 (1984); Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 32 I 
(1977); Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558 (1992). 
a. Permissible Basis 
An expert's opinion may have either one or several bases, which must suffice to 
provide a rational basis for his or her opinion, which in turn is relevant to the substantive 
evidence developed in the case. 
Like the opinions of a lay witness, an expert's opinions may be based on first-
hand knowledge, such as examination of the personal injury plaintiff. 
But, because experts are freed from the first-hand knowledge requirement (see 
Rules 5-602 and 5-703), the expert's opinion also may have a hearsay basis. (Rule 5-703 
does not mean, however, that one may call an "expert" who simply parrots another's 
opinion, without adding anything of his or her own.) See Jackson v. Jackson, 249 Md. 
170, 174 (1968) (expert opinion as to testator's mental incapacity inadmissible when 
merely based on opinions of other experts in records proffered in evidence). 
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The hearsay basis may be simply other witnesses' testimony in the case, that the 
expert has heard at trial. It may be out-of-court statements falling within exceptions to 
the hearsay rule. 
But, under Rule 5-703, it also may be data inadmissible in evidence, that is 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. For example, a psychiatrist may rely on a 
psychologist's report, even though that report was prepared in anticipation of trial and 
would not qualify under the hearsay exception for business records. 
Often an expert's opinion will be based on a combination of first-hand knowledge 
and hearsay. For example, the explosives experts who investigated the October 2000 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen, would have relied on both hearsay and their 
own personal examination of the ship. Whether particular information is reasonably 
relied on by the expert is to be determined by the court as a preliminary question of fact 
under Rule 5-1 04(a). See Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558 (1993). See also United States 
v. Brown, 299 F.3d 1252, 1256-58 & n.3 (11 th Cir. 2002) (DEA agent's opinion as to 
value of cocaine base in Bermuda was properly based in part on other agent's information 
from Bermuda authorities), vacated on other grounds, 123 S.Ct. 1928 (U.S. 2003), on 
remand, 2003 WL 21983029 (11 th Cir. 2003). 
b. For the Jury's Ears? 
The question arises whether the jury should be informed of reasonably relied upon 
but substantively inadmissible hearsay on which an expert has relied. 
• What are the risks in admitting it, even with a limiting instruction that it is 
admitted not for its truth, but only for the limited purpose of explaining the basis 
of the expert's opinion? 
• What are the risks in excluding it? 
Md. Rule 5-703(b), which was derived from the corollary Kentucky rule and 
became effective with the rest of Title 5 on July 1, 1994, leaves the question of disclosure 
of a substantively inadmissible hearsay basis to the discretion of the court, but cautions 
that it may be admitted only if the underlying basis is "determined to be trustworthy, 
necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged .... " See Milton Co. v. Council of 
Unit Owners of Bentley Place Condominium, 354 Md. 264, 276-77 (1999) (no abuse of 
discretion to admit, for this purpose, surveys interpreted by experts, so that jury could 
evaluate conflicting experts' testimony). A limiting instruction will be given only on 
request. 
Interestingly, FRE 703 followed suit in 2000, when it was amended by adding the 
following italicized language, so that, like Md. Rule 5-703, it cautions the judge against 
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admitting nonsubstantive evidence offered solely to show the basis of expert opinion 
testimony, unless sufficiently necessary and helpful for that purpose: 
Fed.R.Evid. 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion 
or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to 
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
(2000 amendment italicized.) 
VII. Opinions on Ultimate Issues: Rule 5-704 
§ 1. General Test: Helpful and Having a Sufficient Basis 
Rule 5-704. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE. 
(a) In general. Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable merely because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
Rule 5-704 addresses whether an opinion on an ultimate issue may be admitted, 
e.g., defectiveness of a product. Rule 5-704(a) treats experts just as it does lay witnesses: 
the question is always merely one of whether the opinion is rationally based and will be 
helpful to the trier of fact. See Rules 5-701 and 5-702. If it would not be helpful, it is 
inadmissible. 
Problems. 
38. Lay witness's testimony to meaning of clause in testator's will. Admit? 
Conrades v. Heller, 119 Md. 448, 452 (1913). 
39. Plaintiff offers expert opinion that city violated Fair Housing Amendments Act in 
shutting off water to two newly constructed group homes for developmentally 
disabled adults, when City argued that developer had breached contract. Admit? 
Good Shepherd Manor Foundation v. City of Momence, 323 FJd 557 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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40. Expert testimony offered as to reasonableness of defendant police otlicer in 
releasing police dog on suspect. Admit? 
United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 622-25 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1644 (2003). 
41. In money laundering case, accused wishes to call psychologist to testify to his 
assessment of key government witness's personality disorders and the effect these 
disorders have on her ability to perceive, recall, and recount events accurately, 
including her ability to distinguish fact from fantasy; opinion is based on her 
medical records and on observing her demeanor while testifying. Admit? 
United States v. Falcon, 245 F.Supp.2d 1239 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
§ 2. Accused's Mental State that is an Element of the Charged Crime: No 
Rule 5-704(b) Opinion on mental state or condition. An expert witness testifying with respect to 
the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may not state an opinion or inference 
as to whether the defendant had a mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime 
charged. That issue is for the trier of fact alone. This exception does not apply to an ultimate issue 
of criminal responsibility. 
Rule 5-704(b) carves out one clear rule applicable in criminal cases: experts may 
not testify as to whether a criminal defendant had a "mental state or condition constituting 
an element of the crime," such as intent, premeditation, or malice. Nor, in an entrapment 
defense case, mayan expert testify as to whether the accused had a predisposition to 
commit the crime. This portion of Rule 5-704(b) is substantively identical to the 
corollary provision of FRE 704(b). 
See, e.g., United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (defense 
expert properly permitted to testify to factors relevant to accidental discharge of a gun, 
and properly precluded from testifying to whether the shootings at issue were accidental 
or contained those factors); Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558 (1992) (proper to have 
excluded psychiatrist's opinion as to defendant's actual intent at time of killing); 
Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33,47-48 (1988) (error in excluding, in support of imperfect 
self-defense, testimony that defendant's subjective belief that force was necessary to 
prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm was consistent with defendant's 
psychological profile; no error in excluding testimony that defendant infact had such 
subjective beliefat time of offense). (Y Whittington v. State, 147 Md. App. 496, 536-39 
(2002), cert. denied, 373 Md. 408 (2002) (proper to decline to permit defense psychiatrist 
to testify as to voluntariness of confession). 
Expert testimony concerning "general criminal practices" is not precluded. 
United States v. Bailey, 319 F.3d 514, 521-22 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See Shemondy v. State, 
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147 Md. App. 602 (2002) (police sergeant's expert testimony regarding use of pagers and 
codes in drug usage and drug trafficking). 
§ 3. Accused's Sanity or Insanity: Federal Rules No, Maryland Yes 
FRE 704(b), "the Hinckley amendment," was added in 1984, after John 
Hinckley's trial for the attempted assassination of President Reagan in an etTort to obtain 
the afTections of actress Jodie Foster. Hinckley was found to be insane and confined to 
St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Members of the psychiatric community subsequently objected 
that they should not be asked to testify to the ultimate legal issue, as they were in 
Hinckley. FRE 704(b) precludes experts from testifying in federal court to the ultimate 
issue of an accused's criminal responsibility or lack thereof. In federal court, their 
testimony must stop one step before that ultimate conclusion. 
The last sentence of Md. Rule 5-704(b), on the other hand, is dramatically 
opposite. In line with a longstanding Maryland statute, experts in Maryland state court 
are permitted to testify to whether an accused who has raised the insanity ("lack of 
criminal responsibility") defense had the capacity to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of the law. 
VIII. Sufficient Basis for Expert Testimony 
§ 1. When Caesar Has Spoken, and Statutes Establish the Parameters, We Follow 
Caesar 
Statutes apply to a number of areas of expert testimony. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1 0-916(b) (battered spouse syndrome). 
Expert testimony contradicting the premise underlying a statutory presumption is 
inadmissible. City of Frederick v. Shankle, 367 Md. 5 (2001) (trial court properly 
precluded expert's testimony that rejected premise underlying Md. Labor & Empl. Code 
Ann. § 9-503 presumption, that, because of stress of police work, police ot11cers who 
have heart disease are suffering from an occupational disease; expert could have testified 
only if he had simply attributed claimant's heart disease to other factors, and not that 
stress never causes heart disease). Cf Beatty v. TraUmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726 
(1993) (expert's opinion that the bumper height of defendant's vehicle was foreseeably 
unsafe and unreasonably dangerous lacked sufficient basis where the bumper height 
complied with a statutory standard, and the expert neither cited a developing consensus 
nor sound data to buttress his opinion). 
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§ 2. As to Areas of Expert Testimony Not Governed by Statute Maryland Follows 
a 5-401, 5-702, 5-403 Analysis (Except With Regard to "Novel" (Not 
Previously Generally Accepted) Scientific Principles or Theories, as to Which 
It Follows Frye-Reed in Applying Rule 5-702, see Part X) 
a. Is the proffered evidence relevant to the case, under Rule 5-401? See, e.g., 
Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 267-79 (2001) (passive personality irrelevant, as 
defendant's subjective intent was irrelevant to child abuse charge). This is what Judge 
Grimm calls "the fit" of the testimony. 
A factual hearsay basis, inadmissible as substantive evidence, cannot be used to 
make the resulting opinion relevant. If there is no substantive evidence admitted that 
would make the opinion relevant - i.e., the opinion is based upon an entire scenario 
unsupported by substantive evidence, neither the opinion nor the basis will be 
admissible. Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 575-81 (1992); Waltermeyer v. State, 60 Md. 
App. 69, 75-80 (1984) (non-treating physician may not testify to opinion based on 
hearsay related by patient, his wife and his sister, none of whom testified, totally 
unsupported by evidence). Accord Burns v. Secretary of Dept. of Health & Human 
Services, 3 F.3d 415 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
Problem. 
42. Race and sex discrimination plaintitT protTers an expert opinion that plaintitT 
suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, in part caused by events that were 
not discriminatory. Admit? 
Neely v. Miller Brewing Co., 246 F.Supp.2d 866 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
b. Under Rule 5-702: 
(1) Is the witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, training, or 
education? and 
(2) Is expert testimony appropriate on the particular subject? and 
(3) Does a sufficient factual basis exist to support the expert testimony? 
See, e.g., Evans v. State, 332 Md. 24 (1991) (trial court correctly concluded that "amnesic 
episode" was legally insufficient foundation for psychiatrist's conclusion that accused 
suffered from a "mental disorder" as defined under Md. Health Gen. Code Ann. § 12-
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108); Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266 (1988) (under circumstances, admitting expert 
opinion that child had been sexually abused was an abuse of discretion, as it had 
insufficient basis, i.e., only what victim had said; as an "alternative reason," the opinion 
was inadmissible "as a matter oflaw," because it was an opinion that the child's 
testimony was credible); Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 142-43 (1998) (proper 
to exclude expert's testimony that products other than defendants' caused decedent's 
mesothelioma, as it lacked sufficient factual basis). 
Problems. 
43. Plaintiff patron of Splash Mountain was injured when riding the Cannonball 
Slide. She offers expert testimony regarding defendant's duty to warn of the 
specific dangers of that slide and to instruct patrons to keep their knees tucked 
when entering the catch pool. Her expert was a private investigator, experienced 
in recreational facility construction and maintenance, who went down the slide 6 
to 12 times in different positions, but was uninjured. Admit? 
Stolting v. Jolly Roger Amusement Park, Inc., 37 Fed.Appx. 80 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) 
(unpublished). 
44. In drug distribution prosecution, informant is called to testify that defendant 
understood that conversation between the two, though purportedly about an 
asbestos removal job, was really a coded discussion of a drug deal. Sufficient to 
admit? 
United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 139-43 (2d Cir. 2002). 
45. To prove that asbestos release occurred between 1978 and 1991, results of dust 
sampling tests conducted between 1996 and 2002. Admit? 
Port Authority v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 245 F.Supp.2d 563 (D.N.J. 200 I), aiI'd, 311 F.3d 226 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
46. Plaintiff offers expert testimony that Philip Morris could have used one of several 
feasible alternative designs that would have reduced the cancer risk of its 
cigarettes. There has been no animal testing of these designs and their impact on 
the cancer rate. Admit? 
Labelle ex reo Labelle V. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 508 (D.S.C. 2001). 
-22-
47. Officer's testimony that he could identify crack cocaine in a pat-down. Admit? 
Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 461-65 (1996). 
48. State trooper's opinion that, based on HGN test of driver, driver had a specific 
level of blood alcohol. Admit? 
Wilson v. State, 124 Md. App. 543 (1999). 
c. Even if the evidence passes muster under Rules 5-401 and 5-702, should the 
trial court exclude it in its discretion under Rule 5-403? 
Quaere. 
Rule 5-403 provides: 
Rule 5-403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
An eyewitness identifies the accused as the perpetrator of the charged robbery. 
The defense is an alibi. The defense wishes to call a psychologist to testify to the frailties 
of eyewitness testimony. Admit? What are the relevant considerations? 
Maryland appellate courts have not definitely ruled whether expert testimony about the frailty of 
eyewitness testimony is admissible. In Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164 (1986), the Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court's exclusion of such testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Other jurisdictions' 
decisions are divided on this question. See, e.g, United States v. Mathis. 264 F.3d 321, 333-44 (3d Cir. 
200 I), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1211 (U.S. 2002) (under circumstances, harmless error to exclude bank 
robbery defendant's proffered expert testimony on memory, intended to counter police officer/eyewitness's 
identification, concerning likelihood that officer had focused on gun in suspect's hand); United States v. 
Sullivan, 246 F.Supp.2d 696 (E.O. Ky. 2003) (after Daubert hearing, plaintiffs motion to exclude expert 
testimony regarding theories of memory and their impact on the reliability of eyewitness identification was 
denied); People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157,750 N.E.2d 63 (2001) (trial court acted within its discretion in 
excluding expert testimony regarding reliability of eyewitness identifications). 
But the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the trial judge has a duty to thoughtfully 
exercise his or her discretion as to whether to give the pattern jury instruction regarding eyewitness 
identification. Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 374 (1997) (failure to exercise discretion was reversible 
error). 
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d. This 401-702-403 analysis is the approach followed by the federal courts, as to all 
expert testimony. But with regard to novel, scientific evidence, Maryland follows instead 
the heightened standard of Frye-Reed. 
IX. Scientific Evidence: A Subcategory of Expert Opinion Evidence 
§ 1. Three Prerequisites for Admissibility 
Scientific evidence is a subcategory of expert opinion evidence. When scientific 
evidence is offered, three foundational prerequisites must be laid: 
1. The process used to obtain the results that are being proved is sound in 
principle (Rule 5-104(a»; 
2. The person following this process or principle was qualified (Rule 5-
104(a); and 
3. The test, etc., was performed properly in this case, on proper equipment, if 
applicable, in good working order (Rule 5-1 04(b». 
a. The Second and Third Requirements 
The second and third requirements are relatively straightforward in general. They 
also are the subject of numerous statutes governing specific types of evidence, such as 
blood and breath tests for alcohol. Some of the statutes create presumptions of 
admissibility, which put the ball in the accused's court to request the presence at trial of 
the State's expert. 
b. The First Requirement: Soundness of the Underlying Principles 
1. Recognition by Statute 
With regard to the first requirement, the soundness of a number of scientific 
principles is governed by statute. In Maryland, these include, for example, radar, blood 
and breath tests for alcohol, certain DNA tests, and human leukocyte antigen blood tests 
for paternity. 
Example: DNA Evidence 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & J ud. Proc. § 1 0-915( c) provides for the admissibility of a 
DNA profile (an analysis of DNA identifying an individual's patterned chemical structure 
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of genetic information) "to prove or disprove the identity of any person" in a criminal 
proceeding. 
The Court of Appeals has held that this statute applies only to DNA tested by the 
restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) technique; testing using the PCR 
technique must be evaluated under Frye-Reed. Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724 (1996). 
In Amstead v. State, 342 Md. 38 (1996), the Court of Appeals held (over the 
dissent of now C.l. Bell) that, because DNA evidence collected using the RFLP technique 
is made admissible by statute, generalized challenges to its admissibility are precluded. 
The statute also makes admissible expert testimony to statistics showing the odds of a 
random match under either the "product rule" or the "ceiling principle" method (in 
Amstead, 1 in 480,000,000 and 1 in 800,000, respectively). The statute precludes 
exclusion under Md. Rule 5-403: DNA evidence may be excluded only if it is irrelevant, 
or if case-specific defects in the testing procedure make particular limits unhelpful. The 
trial judge must permit the defense to cross-examine a State's DNA expert about testing 
errors and incidents of contamination at the lab in question. Williams. 
Thus, the statute does not preclude a trial judge from excluding evidence of a 
DNA profile if the court concludes that the laboratory in question did not follow proper 
procedures, so that the test results are unhelpful. See also United States v. Jacobus, 955 
F.2d 786, 791-800 (2d Cir. 1992). 
In 2003, the General Assembly substantially revised Maryland's statutes 
pertaining to the collection, testing, and preservation of DNA samples. S.B. 363 (Md. 
2003), amending Md. Ann. Code Crim. Pro. § 8-201 and Md. Ann. Code, Public Safety 
§§ 2-501, 2-502, 2-504, 2-505, and 2-510, etTective Oct. 1, 2003. 
Problem. 
49. State produces a letter from the testing laboratory that the analysis was validated 
(as required by Md. Ct. & Jud. Proc. § 10-915) according to standards established 
by the Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (TWGDAM); or the 
DNA Advisory Board of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation. Defense moves for 
a pretrial hearing on whether the tests were so approved. Must the court grant 
the motion? 
Robinson v. State, 151 Md. App. 384, 395-97 (2003). 
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When the soundness of the underlying principle is not recognized by statute, there 
are two other possibilities. 
2. Judicial Notice 
If sutliciently well established, it may be judicially noticed either through 
common general knowledge (e.g., the uniqueness of fingerprints) or by resort to 
indisputable sources. See Rule 5-201 (b) Gudicial notice is appropriate of facts that are 
"not subject to reasonable dispute" because they are either (1) "generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or (2) "capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." 
(Note that, in federal court, fingerprinting may not so easily pass muster.) 
Compare United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 523 (E.D.Pa. 2002) (case in which 
the court had initially excluded opinion that fingerprint came from a particular person) 
with, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 246 F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D.Ky. 2003) (ACE-V 
methodology for fingerprinting, as practiced by F.B.I., satisfies Daubert). A divided 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has upheld, against a 
Daubert challenge, the admission of expert testimony regarding both fingerprints and 
handwriting. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. filed (U.S. June 
2003). 
Example: Probability Evidence 
Under generally accepted statistical theories, the likelihood of a particular event is 
the product obtained by multiplying the probability of each of its independent 
components. For example, the likelihood of rolling a 1 (or 2,3,4,5, or 6) on a die is 116. 
The likelihood ofrolling "snake eyes" on two dice is 116 x 116 = 1136. 
• Should such probability evidence be admissible with regard, for example, to 
whether a perpetrator was someone other than the accused? Or whether an 
infant's death was accidental? 
In People v. Collins, 68 Ca1.2d 319 (1968), eyewitnesses testified that the charged 
robbery was committed by a white woman, who wore her blond hair in a ponytail, and a 
black man, who had a moustache and a beard. They fled in a partly yellow car. There 
was evidence that the defendants matched this description. 
The State called a math professor who testified as follows: 
Characteristic 
Car with yellow 
Man with moustache 
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Probability 
1110 
114 
Woman with ponytail 
Woman with blonde hair 
Black man with beard 
Interracial couple in car in 
California in 1968 
1110 
1/3 
1110 
111,000 
Therefore, he testified, the odds of having a couple meet that description was 
1112,000,000 (10 x 4 x 10 x 3 x 10 x 1,000 = 12,000,000). 
Quaere. Is this admissible testimony? 
Note that it gets complicated without a math expert to explain it. The probability 
in this example is not quite the same as the odds. Ifthere is 1 couple in 12,000,000 
matching these characteristics, the probability that there is more than 1 is 41 %. 
Should the prosecutor be permitted to argue that, if we believe the 
eyewitnesses' testimony, the evidence shows that we are 99.99999% sure that 
the defendants were the robbers? Allow the argument? See Wilson v. State, 
370 Md. 191 (2002). 
Problem. (from Howard Raifta, DECISION ANALYSIS, pp. 20-21 (Addison-Wesley 1968)) 
I have two canvas bags filled with poker chips. The first bag contains 70 green 
chips and 30 white chips, and I shall refer to this as the predominantly green (PG) 
bag. The second bag contains 70 white chips and 30 green chips, and I shall refer 
to this as the predominantly white (PW) bag. The chips are all identical except for 
color. I now mix up the two bags so that you don't know which is which, and I 
put one of them aside. Now suppose that you choose 12 chips at random from 
this remaining bag and it turns out that you draw eight green chips and four white 
chips. 
• What do you think the probability is that the bag you have sampled from is 
predominantly green? 
• Is it predominantly green by a preponderance of the evidence? By clear and 
convincing evidence? Beyond a reasonable doubt? 
In Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 (2002), a father was charged with infanticide. 
Evidence showed that both that infant, and another infant fathered by the defendant, but 
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with a different mother, had had sudden deaths in their cribs, when under the father's 
care. The trial judge admitted experts' testimony regarding their reliance on the 
probability, arrived at by using the product rule, of two SIDS deaths of infants having the 
same father. One prosecution expert concluded that the probability was 1 in 100,000,000; 
another testified that it was 1 in 4,000,000. The Court of Appeals reversed the father's 
conviction, on the grounds that the statistical evidence did not satisfy Frye-Reed: 
reviewing the issue de novo, the Court of Appeals found that because there were several 
studies suggesting that there might be a genetic component to SIDS, the children's deaths 
were not proved to be independent, and the product rule could not be used. 
The prosecutor had remarked in closing argument that there was a one in 10 
million chance-not that the deaths were not homicides-but that the accused was 
innocent. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutors' remark was not cured by the 
trial judge's subsequent instruction. 
Problems. 
50. In an age discrimination suit, expert analyses from the year in which the plaintitT 
was fired conclude that 59.2% of the workforce were older, but that older 
employees accounted for 70.3% of those terminated in employer's reduction in 
force, and that there was a less than 5% probability that age was related to 
termination by chance. Admit? 
51. The plaintiff also otTers analyses trom the following year, also comparing active 
exempt employees with employees selected for termination, but as to which the 
expert admitted that there were inadequacies in the popUlation used and that the 
results would have been different had she been able to identify and exclude 
nonexempt employees from her analysis. Admit? 
See Murphy v. General Electric Co, 245 F.Supp.2d 459 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
3. Frve-Reed 
But "novel" scientific evidence that has not been recognized by statute (e.g., 
voiceprint, lie detector tests, the causation of cancer by a particular agent), must be 
formally proved. The federal and Maryland rules have taken ditTerent paths regarding 
the proof required. 
In Maryland state court, until a principle has been held to have gained 
general acceptance among scientists in the relevant field, testimony based upon that 
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principle will be inadmissible. Once it has gained such acceptance, testimony based 
upon it will be admissible, as long as the expert is qualified, the evidence will be 
helpful, and is relevant to the other evidence in the case. 
§ 2. Maryland State Court: Frye-Reed 
The leading and incredibly brief decision in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
CD. C. Cir. 1923) concerned an early predecessor of the current polygraph test. It was held 
inadmissible, although it was the defendant who offered the evidence, as exculpatory. 
Frye established a requirement that scientific evidence will become admissible only when 
the underlying principle or process has gained "general acceptance in the particular field 
in which it belongs." Under Frye, until the relevant scientists generally agree that the 
principle or process is sound, its results will be inadmissible. 
Fifty-five years later, in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), a case involving a 
"voiceprint" offered by the prosecution, the Court of Appeals adopted the Frye test in a 
four to three decision. 
• What policy arguments support Frye-Reed, which sets a high bar for 
admissibility of scientific evidence? (See majority opinion by Judge Eldridge, 
joined by Judges Cole, Drapps, and Levine.) 
• What is the downside to having such a high standard to meet? (See Judge 
Smith's dissent, joined by Chief Judge Robert Murphy and Judge Orth.) 
§ 3. Federal Court: Daubert Rejected Frye in Favor of a 401 Relevant - 702 
Reliable - 403 Analysis Across the Board, as to All Expert Testimony 
Although the FRE went into effect in 1975, the federal courts were divided for 18 
years as to whether the FRE had codified Frye or jettisoned it. In Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 597 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that 
FRE 702 had overruled Frye. Daubert held, on the one hand, that the federal trial courts 
do have a gate-keeping function to exclude "junk science." But it also held that there is 
no hard and fast requirement that novel scientific evidence have gained general 
acceptance in its field before it will be admissible. 
Rather, the test for admissibility is a flexible one, requiring FRE 401 relevance, 
FRE 702 reliability, and a final screening under FRE 403. The Daubert Court 
suggested that, in making its "gatekeeping" determination, the trial court consider, 
inter alia, whether the proffered expert's technique or theory (1) can be or has been 
tested in some objective sense, (2) has been subject to peer review and publication, 
and (3) has been generally accepted in the particular field; the court should also 
look at (4) the technique or theory's known or potential rate of error, and (5) 
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standards and controls. No one factor provides a litmus test. Therefore, even 
evidence that has gained "general acceptance" may be excluded in federal court, just as 
evidence that has not gained "general acceptance" may be admitted in federal comi. 
In its decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1997), the 
Supreme Court made clear that this 401-702-403 analysis is not restricted to scientific 
evidence, but applies to any evidence offered under FRE 702. If the Rule's requirements 
are met, the expert's opinion need not be stated to be held to a particular standard, such as 
a "reasonable degree of certainty or probability." Samuel v. Ford Motor Co., 112 
F.Supp.2d 460 (D.Md. 2000). 
A 2000 amendment to FRE 702 codified the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert 
and its progeny by adding, as explicit conditions to the admission of expert testimony, 
that "( 1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FRE 702 now reads: 
Rule 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, kill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, ifCl) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
The amendment made the federal rule more similar to the language of Md. Rule 5-
702, which requires the court to find that expert testimony is appropriate "on the 
particular subject" and that "a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert 
testimony." See Giant Food v. Booker, 2003 WL 22051771 (Md. App. Sept. 3, 2003) 
("This court found that while Rule 5-702 does not specifically state that the expert 
testimony must be 'the product of reliable principles and methods,' Maryland case law 
interpreting Rule 5-702 requires such a foundation."). 
But the third requirement went further than the Md. Rule. In this author's 
opinion, FRE 702(3) forces federal judges to become fact-finders under Rule 104(a) as to 
issues that ought to be resolved, in a jury trial, under Rule 1 04(b). If a reasonable jury 
could find that the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably, the evidence 
should come in (this is what would happen in Maryland state court). 
Under Daubert, the federal district court must hold a pretrial hearing and make 
specific factual findings supporting its conclusion. Busch v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., 40 Fed. 
Appx. 947, 960-61 (6th Cir. 2002) (reversing and remanding due to failure to do so). 
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The appellate standard of review under Daubert, as explained in, e.g., United 
States v. Young, 316 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2002), is as follows: 
We review the district court's implementation of the Daubert framework with respect to 
the admission of expert testimony de novo. Once we are convinced that the district court properly 
applied the Daubert framework, however, we review the decision to admit or exclude the expert 
testimony for an abuse of discretion. 
§ 4. The Maryland Rules of Evidence 
When adopting Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
chose not to be explicit as to whether it would follow Daubert or instead retain the Frye-
Reed standard. From 1994 to date there has been no indication of movement in Maryland 
away from Frye-Reed. 
On the contrary, the Committee note to Md. Rule 5-702 was amended in 1999 to 
reaffirm Frye-Reed. 
x. Difficulties in Application of Frye-Reed 
§ 1. When Frye-Reed Applies, Who is the Relevant Scientific Community? 
Must the evidence be accepted by scientists other than those working on 
developing that theory or principle? 
§ 2. Appellate Review 
a. Failure to apply Frye-Reed when applicable, or application of it (to exclude 
crucial evidence) when inapplicable, is likely to be a slam-dunk for reversible 
error. See Keene Corp. v. Hall, 96 Md. App. 644 (1993) (rejecting argument that 
Frye-Reed is inapplicable in civil cases and finding reversible error, in this civil 
case, to admit evidence that failed to meet the Frye-Reed test). 
b. Standard of review, when Frye-Reed applies: Cobey v. State, 73 Md. App. 233, 
239, 244 (1987) (the standard of review is merely whether the trial court's finding 
is "against the weight of the evidence rather than whether it is clearly erroneous," 
but "the appellate court may consider evidence which was not presented to the 
trial court"), cert. denied, 312 Md. 127 (1988). 
§ 3. The Biggest Brain-Teaser: When Does Frye-Reed Apply? 
a. The Reed majority, 283 Md. at 383, cited application of Frye by other states' 
courts to paraffin tests, medical testimony regarding the cause of birth defects, 
breath analysis devices designed to test for intoxication, truth serum injunctions, 
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blood tests, neutron activation analysis, gunshot residue tests, Nalline tests for 
detection of narcotics use, ink identification tests, and hypnotism. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
and even 4. 
The Frye-Reed test has been applied in Maryland to, for example: 
Hypnotically refreshed memory, Collins v. State, 296 Md. 670 (1983) (but 
C.J. Murphy, concurring and dissenting, dissented from the majority's 
application of the Frye-Reed test, since, in part, "the 'result' of hypnosis is 
not an assertion that the testimony is necessarily true or accurate"). 
Chromosome variant analysis, Cobey v. State, 73 Md. App. 233 (1987) 
(reversible error to admit State's expert testimony of C.Y.A., not shown to 
have met Frye-Reed test, offered to show that rape defendant could have 
been father of victim's aborted fetus). 
Polarized light microscopy, Keene Corp. v. Hall, 96 Md. App. 644 (1993) 
(reversible error to admit evidence of use of polarized light microscopy to 
identify asbestos fibers in tissue at the site of plaintiff s tumor; such use of 
PLM on a stained slide of human tissue was not shown to be generally 
accepted in the medical community; plaintiffs had offered a second 
expert's testimony that the underlying "physical principles" were very well 
accepted; Court of Special Appeals found that evidence was of a novel 
application of a scientific "technique," one different from that for which it 
was designed). 
Cadaver location by trained dogs, Clark v. State, 140 Md. App. 540, 578-
79, cert. denied, 368 Md. 527 (2002). 
But Frye-Reed has been held inapplicable to: 
1. Opinion that alleged rape victim suffered from post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98, 110 (1986) (no abuse 
of discretion to admit that expert testimony; Frye-Reed standard does not 
apply to this medical opinion evidence, which was not "presented as a 
scientific test the results of which were controlled by inexorably physical 
laws;" in the future, "when ruling on whether to receive State proffered 
evidence of PTSD a trial judge will have to weigh the benefit of the 
evidence not only against potential unfair prejudice, but also against the 
complexity of possibly accompanying issues and against the time required 
properly to try the expanded case"). 
2. How asbestos directly causes cancer, Myers v. Celotex Corp., 88 Md. App. 
442 (1991) (reversible error to apply Frye-Reed standard to doctor's 
-32-
Problem. 
opinion testimony, when doctor testified that his opinion rose to a 
"reasonable medical probability," "even though he could not state that the 
theory he espoused was generally accepted by the medical community"), 
cert. denied, 325 Md. 249 (1992). 
3. Frailties of eyewitness testimony, Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 177-
86 (1986) (Frye-Reed test inapplicable to expert testimony as to frailties of 
eyewitness testimony, but no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence 
proffered by defense). 
4. Field sobriety tests, Crampton v. State, 71 Md. App. 375, 386-88 (1987) 
(Frye-Reed test inapplicable to field sobriety tests given by police officers, 
which are "essentially empirical observations, involving no controversial, 
new, or 'scientific' technique. Their use is guided by practical experience, 
not theory;" evidence was admitted properly). 
5. Compensable medical services, Sabatier v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co., 323 Md. 232 (1991) (Frye-Reed test inapplicable in determining 
whether thermography is a valid diagnostic tool and is therefore 
compensable as a "necessary" and "reasonable medical service" within the 
coverage of the PIP statute). 
6. The accuracy of particular products or devices used to apply sound 
scientific principles. Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 573 (1995). 
52. State calls Assistant Medical Examiner, who performed the autopsy, to testify that 
because of lack of swelling in baby's spinal cord, injuries to baby's head, neck, 
and spine occurred less than one hour before her death. Defense argues and 
presents expert testimony that experts in the field of forensic pathology do not 
accept the proposition that lack of swelling in the central nervous system can be 
used to detennine the period of time within which the deceased was injured. Does 
Frye-Reed apply? 
Giddens v. State, 148 Md. App. 407 (2002), cert. denied, 374 Md. 83 (2003) ("[B]ecause 
pathologists do agree that a properly perfonned autopsy will reveal lack of swelling in the brain 
and in the spinal column, an opinion [as to the time of injury] based upon that autopsy finding does 
not violate the Frye-Reed standard. * * * "The logical corollary of the Ffye test's focus on 
methodology rather than conclusions is that even unpopular conclusions are admissible so long as 
they are based upon generally accepted methodologies.") (quoting Kuhn v. Sandoz 
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 270 Kan. 443, 14 P.3d 1170 (2000). 
In contrast, Daubert would seem to apply to such an opinion offered in federal court. 
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b. Contrast with Daubert 
See, e.g., Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 244 F.Supp.2d 434-577 (NOT 
A TYPO: 143 pp. opinion) (W.D.Pa. 2003) (results of Daubert hearing on whether 
plaintiff's experts' opinions that her intracerebral hemorrhage was caused by her taking 
the drug Parlodel; court relied in part on three experts appointed by Court pursuant to 
Rule 706; court concluded that requirements of neither 702 nor 703 were met.) 
Quaere. In Maryland, would Frye-Reed apply to an engineering expert's opinion 
regarding the defective design of a catheter inserted into the plaintiff's 
bladder? 
Cf McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253 (11 th Cir. 2002) 
(excluding evidence, after Daubert analysis). 
XI. On Which Side of the Fence is the Grass Greener, Frye-Reed or Daubert? 
§ 1. Should Maryland Stick with Frye-Reed? 
Requiring general acceptance will force us to wait longer to admit novel scientific 
evidence, even though it is reliable and will eventually gain general acceptance in its 
field. 
One apparent advantage of the DaubertlKumho Tire 401-702-403 test is that a 
similar approach may be used in all expert testimony situations, so that errors such as 
those in Myers and Sabatier for failing to apply Frye-Reed when it should be applied or 
vice-versa, can be avoided. But Daubert also has caused similar problems, as well as 
vastly multiplied lengthy pretrial hearings on expert testimony. 
§ 2. How About Half a Loaf? Should Frye-Reed's Requirement of "General 
Acceptance" Be Limited to Criminal Cases, Where a Person's Liberty or Life 
Is at Issue? 
See Sabatier v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 323 Md. 232, 249 (1991) (The 
Reed court adopted the Frye test "deliberately ... to interpose a substantial obstacle to the 
unrestrained admission of evidence in criminal cases based upon new scientific 
principles."). 
Another possible approach is that proposed by the Uniform Law Commissioners 
in 1998. Under this approach, Frye would provide the initial test, but a party dissatisfied 
with the result under Frye could challenge it by relying on the Daubert factors. 
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§ 3. Are the Bottom Lines Different under Frye-Reed and under Daubert? 
a. Frve Appears Stricter on Its Face 
At first, many believed that Daubert would be more lenient than Frye-Reed. As 
examples of the differences in results under the federal and Maryland tests, consider that 
Maryland courts continue to find polygraph evidence strictly inadmissible even if the 
parties have stipulated to its admissibility. C,/ United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 
(1998) (Military Rule of Evidence excluding all polygraph evidence is not 
unconstitutional). On the other hand, some federal courts have begun to admit polygraph 
evidence under certain circumstances. Compare United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 
1536 n.l 0 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("Polygraph evidence may be admitted to impeach or 
corroborate testimony of a witness at trial within the court's discretion, so long as the 
opposing party has adequate notice of the evidence and an opportunity to secure its own 
polygraph.") with United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494,496-50 1 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(several panels of the Fourth Circuit have announced a per se rule of exclusion of 
polygraph evidence, whether inculpatory or exculpatory), cert. filed (U.S. 2003). See 
United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632,640 (7th Cir. 2001) (exclusion affirmed as not an 
abuse of discretion; but "[ a] district court need not conduct a full Daubert analysis in 
order to determine the admissibility of standard polygraph evidence, and instead may 
examine the evidence under a Rule 403 framework. Nonetheless, we posit that the 
factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Daubert remain a useful tool for gauging the 
reliability of the proffered testimony, as reliability may factor into a 403 balancing test."). 
Similarly, Reed found "voiceprint" evidence inadmissible because voiceprints had 
not achieved "general acceptance"; but the federal district court's admission of such 
evidence under a Daubert-type analysis was affirmed in United States v. Baller, 519 F .2d 
463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975), a pre-Daubert case. Judge 
Butzner, writing for the panel in Baller, said: 
Absolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion is not required for admissibility. 
* * * Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use 
prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same 
manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and 
refutation. 
519 F.2d at 466. Under the federal approach to novel scientific evidence, a split of expert 
opinion merely affects the weight of the evidence, if it passes the 401-702-403 balancing 
test. 
A number of other states, including California and Washington, have chosen to 
remain with Frye, though some others have chosen to follow Daubert. See Kathleen 
Eftimoff, The Decade ajier Daubert Proves Tough on Expert Witnesses, 27 LITlG. NEWS, 
No.5, at 1, 8 (July 2002) (plaintiffs choosing state courts where Frye applies). 
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b. But Frve Jurisdictions Are Not Always Stricter 
Often the results under Frye-Reed and Daubert will be the same. On remand in 
Daubert itself, the scientific evidence offered there (to show that a pregnant woman's use 
of Bendectin could cause birth defects) was still held inadmissible, under the new test. 43 
F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
And the application of Daubert to issues to which Frye-Reed does not apply may 
result in exclusion of evidence in federal court that has been admitted in state court. See 
§ 4 infra. 
§ 4. Burden on the Federal District Courts 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Daubert, 
complained that Daubert would require federal judges to become "amateur scientists." 
113 S.Ct. at 2799,2800. Despite talk of "federal science boards," to resolve certain 
scientific disputes, they have not materialized. 
For example, Maryland's case law, Crampton v. State, 71 Md. App. 375 (1997) 
(results offield sobriety tests admissible) and Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145, 164 
(1995) (HGN results admissible), holds that Frye-Reed does not even apply to field 
sobriety tests performed by police officers. But Judge Grimm was required to perform a 
lengthy Daubert analysis on such evidence in United States v. Horn, 185 F.Supp.2d 530 
(D.Md.2002). 
Judge Grimm concluded that the arresting officer could not refer, at trial on the 
merits (as opposed to the probable cause issue) to field sobriety tests - "walk and tum," 
"one leg stand," and "horizontal gaze nystagmus" - as tests, as they fail to meet Daubert 
standards when offered to prove blood alcohol content. The officer could testify to his 
observations: 
In so doing, however, the officer may not use value-added descriptive language to characterize the 
subject's performance of the SFSTs, such as saying that the subject 'failed the test' or 'exhibited' a 
certain number of 'standardized clues' during the test; (5) Ifthe Government introduces evidence 
that a defendant exhibited nystagmus when the officer perfornled the horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test, the defendant may bring out either during cross examination of the prosecution witnesses or 
by asking the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there are many causes of nystagmus other 
than alcohol ingestion; and (6) If otherwise admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 701, a police officer may 
give lay opinion testimony that a defendant was driving while intoxicated or under the influence of 
alcohol. In doing so, however, the officer may not bolster the lay opinion testimony by reference 
to any scientific, technical or specialized information learned from law enforcement or traffic 
safety instruction, but must confine his or her testimony to helpful firsthand observations of the 
defendant. 
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XII. Trends: Computers as Experts 
See, e.g., as to Computational fluid dynamics: Admission of evidence regarding expert's 
use of computer models to measure flow of air around and through a jet engine affirmed. 
Questions regarding correctness of models, etc., used went to weight of the testimony. Quiet 
Technology DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333 (l1 th Cir. 2003), reh 'g denied 
(lith Cir. 2003). 
See Md. Rule 2-504.3. What has been your experience with computer analyses, 
animations, and simulations? 
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Answers to Problems. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
No. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
No. 
No. 
Yes. 
No. 
Yes. 
No. 
No. 
9. Yes, admission affd. 
10. No: superfluous and overly influential. Rev'ble error to have admitted. 
11. Error (tho' harmless) to have admitted. 
12. Yes. Rev'ble error to have excluded. 
13. This court said yes. 
14. Admission affd. 
15. Admission aff d. 
16. Yes. 
17. Rev'ble error to exclude re: bean patch. Admissible re: train. 
18. Yes. 
19. Yes. 
20. Yes. 
21. No. 
22. Rev'ble error to admit. Yes. 
23. No. 
24. No. 
25. No. 
26. Yes, if in better position than jury. 
27. No. 
28. Yes. 
29. No. 
30. No. Rev'ble error to have admitted. 
31. No. 
32. No. 
33. No. Exclusion affd. 
34. Yes. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting a certified clinical social worker to 
testify as to mental disorders; fact that a statute, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102, 
expressly authorizes licensed psychologists to testify "merely limits the court's discretion to 
deny a person in that class [see State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86 (1990)] expert status for the 
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purpose of testifying. When no such statute exists with regard to a person offered as an 
expert, however, the court has broad discretion to determine whether that person will be 
qualified as an expert or not.") As to licensed clinical social workers' ability to testify to 
mental diagnoses, see Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. § 19-101 (m)( 4 )(ii). 
35. No. 
36. No, but admission affd as expert opinion. 
37. Yes. 
38. No. 
39. No. Exclusion affd. 
40. Yes. Admission affd. 
41. No. 
42. No. 
43. No. 
44. Rev'ble error to admit as lay opinion, where no foundation as to why defendant would know 
what informant meant. 
45. No. 
46. No. 
47. No. 
48. No. 
49. No. 
50. Yes. 
51. No. 
52. No. 
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